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This paper considers a distributed beamforming and resource
allocation technique for a radar system in the presence of multiple
targets. The primary objective of each radar is to minimize its
transmission power while attaining an optimal beamforming strategy
and satisfying a certain detection criterion for each of the targets.
Therefore, we use convex optimization methods together with
noncooperative and partially cooperative game theoretic approaches.
Initially, we consider a strategic noncooperative game (SNG), where
there is no communication between the various radars of the system.
Hence each radar selfishly determines its optimal beamforming and
power allocation. Subsequently, we assume a more coordinated game
theoretic approach incorporating a pricing mechanism. Introducing
a price in the utility function of each radar/player enforces
beamformers to minimize the interference induced to other radars
and to increase the social fairness of the system. Furthermore, we
formulate a Stackelberg game by adding a surveillance radar to the
system model, which will play the role of the leader, and hence the
remaining radars will be the followers. The leader applies a pricing
policy of interference charged to the followers aiming at maximizing
his profit while keeping the incoming interference under a certain
threshold. We also present a proof of the existence and uniqueness of
the Nash equilibrium (NE) in both the partially cooperative and
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noncooperative games. Finally, the simulation results confirm the
convergence of the algorithm in all three cases.
I. INTRODUCTION
Multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) radar is an
innovative technology that has raised expectations over the
last decade that it will provide substantial improvements
to the currently used radar systems. The main
characteristic that allows MIMO radar to offer superior
capabilities as compared with other radar regimes is its
waveform diversity, which implies that MIMO radar can
use multiple antennas to simultaneously transmit several
orthogonal waveforms and multiple antennas to receive
the reflected signals from the targets [1]. There are two
principal MIMO radar schemes considered in the
literature, the systems incorporating colocated antennas
and those that consist of widely separated antennas
(bistatic, multistatic) [2, 3]. The leading fields of research
within MIMO radar technology are beamformer and
waveform design, detection optimization, and radar
imaging [4–6]. Succeeding the advances in those fields,
the main advantages offered by MIMO radar are higher
angular resolution, direct applicability of adaptive array
techniques, multiple target detection, and the ability to
obtain spatial diversity in the target’s radar cross section
(RCS). Nevertheless, one substantial drawback in a
multiple target, distributed radar system, that has not yet
been completely resolved, is the multiple source
interference imposed at the receivers of each radar. More
specifically, the interradar,1 the intraradar,2 and the clutter
interference lead to reduced efficiency and performance
degradation of the radar system. Hence, an optimal
beamforming and power allocation strategy is crucial as it
minimizes the interference in between the radars of the
same organization, while preserving a detection criterion.
Game theory is a natural and effective tool for modeling
this kind of interactions, as it offers a mathematical
framework of conflict and cooperation between intelligent,
self-interested, and rational players.
The increasing need for independent, autonomous, and
decentralized communication systems has sparked much
interest in using game theoretic techniques in the
communication literature [7]. More specifically, the
aforementioned distributed, multistatic beamforming and
resource allocation problem in radar systems can be
compared with similar issues raised in multicell wireless
systems in communication applications [8–16]. In [8], the
authors introduced the idea of joint beamforming and
power control, proposing an iterative algorithm to
simultaneously obtain the optimal beamforming and
power vectors. The incorporation of game theory in this
context then rapidly became a focal point in
1 Cross channel (direct) and indirect interference induced among
different radars.
2 Interference imposed from the transmitters to the receivers of the same
radar when detecting two or more different targets.
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communications research [9–14]. The majority of this
literature considers the technique of strategic
noncooperative games (SNG), where each player selfishly
maximizes its payoff function, given the strategies of the
other players. The authors of [9] exploited an iterative
water-filling algorithm to reach the Nash equilibrium (NE)
in a noncooperative, distributed, multiuser power control
problem. Since each player greedily optimizes its utility
function, the equilibrium might not be the Pareto-optimal
solution. Introducing pricing policies to the system
resources leads to a more Pareto-efficient solution and
increases the social welfare of the system. A pricing
regime that is a linear function of the transmit power was
studied in [10]. Another example of pricing the transmit
power of each player is considered in [11], whereas in [12]
and [13] the pricing policy is applied on the intercell
interference among the players. In [14], the authors
consider the optimization of a set of precoding matrices at
each node of a multichannel, multiuser cognitive radio
MIMO network in order to minimize the total transmit
power of the network, while applying a pricing scheme
based on global information. Cooperative game theoretic
techniques combined with a two-level Stackelberg game
were utilized in [15] to address the problem of relay
selection and power allocation without the knowledge of
channel state information (CSI). Finally, the authors in
[16] formulated a Stackelberg Bayesian game to obtain the
optimal power allocation for a two-tier network, while
applying an interference constraint at the leader and
considering channel gain uncertainty.
Game theory is also an efficient tool to overcome
various problems that arise in radar systems. In particular,
the authors in [17] approached the problem of polarimetric
waveform design by considering a zero-sum game
between an opponent and the radar system engineer. The
zero-sum game was also used in [18] to investigate the
interaction between a MIMO radar and an intelligent
target, that applies jamming techniques. Potential game
theory was exploited in [19] with the main objectives of
optimal waveform design and maximization of the
signal-to-interference plus noise ratio (SINR). A
noncooperative game theoretic per antenna power
optimization based on signal-to-disturbance ratio (SDR)
estimation with a desired SINR constraint was
investigated in [20]. Noncooperative game theory was also
employed in [21] to facilitate the power control problem in
a radar network. To address the power allocation problem
the authors of [22] used a cooperative game approach and
exploited the Shapley value solution scheme.
In this paper, inspired by the aforementioned game
theoretic methods applied in communications [10–14],
although reinvestigated to adapt to the radar case, we have
developed a broad game theoretic analysis for the optimal
beamforming and resource allocation problem in a MIMO
tracking radar system with multiple targets. Initially, we
consider an SNG, where each radar/player greedily
optimizes the beamforming and power allocation vectors
in two stages. In the first stage, the optimal transmit and
receive beampatterns are designed by exploiting convex
optimization techniques in a power minimization problem,
while attaining a certain detection criterion. After
designing the optimal beampatterns, the primary joint
beamforming and resource allocation problem reduces to a
power only minimization game. Thus, in the second stage
of the game we obtain the best response strategy of a radar
in an SNG setup and show that it is a standard function
[32], which proves the uniqueness of the NE, similar to the
work in [12] for wireless communication applications.
The fact that each radar acts selfishly and does not take
into account the damage it may inflict to other radars,
through interradar interference, leads to a solution that
may not be optimal from a social welfare point of view.
Since we assume that the radars belong to the same
organization, it is safe to consider some sort of
cooperation and introduce a pricing policy to all players in
order to minimize the interference induced to other radars.
More specifically, the radars are encouraged to steer their
beams in directions that cause less damage to other
players, which results in a more Pareto-optimal solution.
In order to complete our radar model, we incorporate a
surveillance radar as part of the previously studied MIMO
tracking radar system. The main application of the
surveillance radar is to continuously search the operating
area for new incoming targets. By adding a surveillance
radar, our hybrid radar system is capable of both acquiring
new targets and tracking every target in an operating field.
However, all radars operate simultaneously and hence the
tracking radars interfere with the surveillance radar and
increase the probability of false alarm. In order to secure
the smooth operation of the system, we set a maximum
limit of interference induced at the surveillance radar. In
order to achieve both the target SINR and to guarantee the
interference limit at the surveillance radar, we utilize a
Stackelberg game approach. In particular, the surveillance
radar is the leader and the MIMO tracking radars are the
followers in the hierarchy of the game. We next introduce
the system model.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a multistatic radar network that consists
of K separate radars each consisting of M transmit/receive
antennas. The set of radars is denoted by C = {1, . . ., K}.
In order to complete the model, L targets are assumed in
the far-field of the radars, so that the main objective for
each radar is to attain a specific detection performance for
every target using the minimum possible transmission
power. In the noncooperative design of the multistatic
radar network, the radars try to minimize their
transmission power independently, having full knowledge
of the uplink and the downlink channels of their own radar,
whereas they have no knowledge of the interradar channel
gains. Since we consider that the radars belong to the same
organization, the design of the model is not competitive,
as there is no deliberate interference between the radars.
However, as we do not assume communication between
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Fig. 1. Multistatic MIMO radar network with two radars and two
targets.
radars a noncooperative game is appropriate. An example
of a multistatic radar network with two radars, two targets,
and clutter in the far-field is illustrated at Fig. 1.
In order to detect the lth target, the transmit array of the
kth radar emits the lth element of the independent,
predesigned waveform vector
ψk(t) = [ψk1(t), . . . ,ψkL(t)]T of size L × 1, which
satisfies the orthogonality condition∫
T0
ψk(t)ψHk (t)dt = IL, where (·)T denotes the transpose
operator, t refers to the time index within the radar pulse,
T0 is the radar pulsewidth, IL is the L × L identity matrix,
and (·)H denotes the Hermitian transpose operator. Thus,
the waveforms corresponding to different targets are not
correlated, i.e.,
∫
T0
ψkl(t)ψkl′(t)dt = 0,where l = l′. We
assume that the waveform vector maintains the
orthogonality condition for a set of acceptable time delays
τ a, τ a
′ and Doppler frequency shifts fDa, fDa ′ , such as [23]∫
T0
ψka(t − τa)ψka′(t − τa′)ej2π (fDa−fDa′ )t dt
≈
{
1, if a = a′
0, if a = a′
However, if the waveforms arrive with considerable delays
and Doppler shifts, we may expect nonzero correlation
between waveforms. This correlation factor is denoted as
k,l,l′(τl,l′) =
∫
T0
ψkl(t)ψkl′(t + τl,l′)ej2π (f )t dt
where τl,l′ is the relevant delay of the waveform returned
from the lth target as compared with the delay of the
waveform returned from the l′th target. The relative
difference in Doppler frequency is given by
f = fDl − fDl′ . This introduces interference between
the signals returning from different targets, as discussed
later.
The M × 1 vector which consists of the complex
elements of the signal transmitted from the kth radar and
intended for the lth target is of the form
xkl(t) = wt(k,l)ψkl(t)
where wt(k,l) is the M × 1 transmit beamforming vector
from radar-k to target-l. Hence, the overall transmitted
signal from radar-k is
xk(t) =
L∑
l=1
xkl(t) =
L∑
l=1
wt(k,l)ψkl(t)
As depicted in Fig. 1, hkl is the channel gain vector from
target-l to radar-k, ckl denotes the interfering signal returns
from the clutter when the kth radar tags target-l. The
cross-channel gain between radar-k and radar-i is denoted
as μki and λkij represents the interradar interfering signal
channel at the kth radar echoing from the jth target and
emitted from the ith radar. The uplink and downlink parts
of the path gains can be obtained by the following
equations with respect to the transmit beamforming
vectors and the receive beamforming vectors, respectively:
ht(kl) = b(θkl)wHt(k,l)a(θkl)βl
hr(kl) = b(θkl)wHr(k,l)a(θkl)βl
ct(kl) = b(θcl(k))wHt(k,l)a(θcl(k))βcl
cr(kl) = b(θcl(k))wHr(k,l)a(θcl(k))βcl
μt(ki) =
L∑
j=1
b(θrad(k,i))wHt(k,j )a(θrad(i,k))
μr(ki) =
L∑
j=1
b(θrad(k,i))wHr(k,j )a(θrad(i,k))
λt(kij ) = b(θki)wHt(i,j )a(θij )βj
λr(kij ) = b(θki)wHr(i,j )a(θij )βj
where wr(k,l) is the M × 1 receive weight vector for
radar-k when aimed at target-l, β l is the complex
amplitude proportional to the RCS of target-l, βcl denotes
the RCS amplitude of the clutter, and a(θkl) and b(θ kl) are
the M × 1 transmit and receive steering vectors for
radar-k, respectively, as defined below:
a(θkl) = [1, ej 2πλ dsin(θkl ), . . . , ej 2πλ (M−1)dsin(θkl )]T
b(θkl) = [1, ej 2πλ dsin(θkl ), . . . , ej 2πλ (M−1)dsin(θkl )]T
where d is the distance between the adjacent antennas and
is considered the same for all radars, θ kl is the azimuth
direction of target-l by considering radar-k as reference,
θcl(k) is the direction of the clutter as seen from the kth
radar and θ rad(k,i) is the direction of radar-i as observed
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from radar-k, and λ is the wavelength of the transmitted
signal. From the definition, it is apparent that the transmit
and receive steering vectors are equal, as the uplink and
downlink channels remain constant over the duration of a
full game.
By matched-filtering at the receiver of radar-k each of
the orthogonal waveforms ψkl(t − τl)ej2πfDl t , l = 1, ..., L,
the desired received signal for the detection of target-l is
obtained by
ydes(kl) = wHr(k,l)ht(kl) (1)
Considering a distributed, multistatic, and multitarget
radar scheme, the detection of a target is deteriorated by
direct and collateral interradar interference, in addition to
the interference induced by the signals intended for other
targets by the same radar, the clutter effect, and the noise
power. As a result, the interference signal can be modeled
as
yinterf (kl) =
( L∑
j =l
wHr(k,l)ht(kj )k,l,j (τl,j )
+
K∑
m=k
L∑
j=1
wHr(k,l)λt(kmj )k,l,m,j (τl,j )
+
K∑
m=k
wHr(k,l)μt(km) +
L∑
i=1
wHr(k,l)ct(ki) + nˆ
)
(2)
where k,l,m,j (τl,j ) denotes the correlation factor between
the waveform emitted from the kth radar and echoed by the
lth target and the waveform emitted from the mth radar but
echoed by the jth target.
Since we defined the desired and interfering signals for
radar-k regarding target-l in (1) and (2), the relevant SINR
is straightforwardly defined as
SINRkl =
∥∥ydes(kl)∥∥2∥∥yinterf (kl)∥∥2 (3)
where ||·|| denotes the Euclidian norm.
Using the above system model, the next section
describes the game theoretic formulation of the proposed
scheme.
III. BEAMFORMER DESIGN AND POWER
ALLOCATION GAME
A. Game Theoretic Formulation
In order to determine the optimal transmit/receive
beamformers and power allocation between the radars, we
incorporate an SNG. The various radars are considered as
players, and therefore the player set is denoted by C = {1,
. . ., K}. Consider the transmit beamforming weight vector
matrix Wt(k) = {wt(k,1), . . ., wt(k,L)} as the strategy of
player-k and the matrix Wt(−k) as the strategy chosen by
the other players. Hence, we define the acceptable strategy
set for radar-k as
Pk(Wt(−k)) = {Wt(k) ∈ CM×L | SINRkl ≥ γkl, ∀l}
where γ kl is the desired SINR for target-l when targeted
from the antennas of radar-k. The decision on the desired
SINR depends on the probabilities of misdetection Pmd
and false alarm Pfa, which are derived from the following
equations [24, 25]:
Pmd (ξkl) = (1 − ξkl)N−1
Pfa(SINRkl, ξkl) = 1 −
(
1 − ξkl1−ξkl 11+NSINRkl
)1−N
where ξ kl denotes the threshold of the generalized
likelihood ratio test (GLRT), applied to determine if there
is absence or presence of a target [25] and N is the number
of samples used for the GLRT. We define a specific design
parameter εkl to set an upper bound on the tolerance
regarding Pmd and Pfa. Hence, the optimum SINRkl for
each radar regarding each target can be determined as
[20, 21]
γ ∗kl = min{SINRkl | ∃ξkl ∈ [0, 1]
s.t.Pmd (ξkl) + Pfa(SINRkl, ξkl) ≤ εkl}.
It is evident from (3) that the SINRkl for player-k is a
function of the beamforming weight vectors (which
include transmission power) of all players. Hence, the set
of admissible strategies Pk(Wt(−k)) for radar-k depends on
the beamforming weight matrix Wt(–k) of every other
player (radar).
The last component required to complete the game is
the utility function for each player, which is defined as
uk(Wt(k)) = ‖Wt(k)‖2F representing the transmit power of
player-k, where ‖ · ‖F denotes the Frobenius norm. The
game is summarized as
G = 〈C, {Pk(Wt(−k))}k∈C, {uk(Wt(k))}k∈C〉
In the SNG considered, given the beamforming
strategies of the other players, each player selfishly
minimizes its power allocation subject to a predefined
detection criterion. As a result, the best response strategy
for player-k is the result of the following optimization:
min
Wt(k)
∥∥Wt(k)∥∥2F
s.t.
|wHt(k,l)hr(kl)|2
L∑
j =l
|wHt(k,l)hr(kj )|2 +
L∑
i=1
|wHt(k,l)cr(ki)|2 + r−kl
≥ γkl, ∀l
(4)
where r−k = [r−k1, . . . , r−kL]T is the total interference
induced by all other radars except radar-k plus the additive
white Gaussian noise (AWGN) from the environment
vector. For target-l, it is defined as r−kl =∑K
m=k
∑L
j=1 |wHt(k,l)λr(kmj )|2 +
∑K
m=k |wHt(k,l)μr(km)|2 + σ 2n .
One of the main objectives of this work is to
investigate whether the game G converges to a stable
point, where no player can profit by unilaterally changing
its beamforming strategy, as it will lead to higher power
consumption to achieve the same SINR for every target.
Such a point is an NE and for the game considered, it is
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defined as the strategy set {W∗t(1), . . . , W∗t(K)} where
uk(W∗t(k)) ≤ uk(Wt(k)), ∀Wt(k) ∈ Pk(W∗t(−k)), ∀k ∈ C.
In the next section we determine the optimal
beampatterns and investigate the best response strategy.
We also prove the existence and uniqueness of the NE of
the game G.
B. Convex Optimization Beamforming and the Best
Response Strategy
Convex optimization has been widely utilized in the
radar beamforming literature. Most of the work
concentrates on designing the beamforming vectors in
order to approximate a desired beampattern, decided by
the target position [26–29]. In the first stage of this
analysis, we determine the optimal beampattern for every
radar corresponding to each of the targets using convex
optimization techniques. After securing the optimal
beampatterns, each player should just allocate the
minimum possible transmission power, while minimizing
the interradar interference and achieving a certain
detection performance.
The optimal transmit beampatterns for each radar can
be designed by solving the following optimization
problem:
min
Wt(k)
L∑
l=1
∥∥wt(k,l)∥∥2
s.t.
|wHt(k,l)hr(kl)|2
L∑
j =l
|wHt(k,l)hr(kj )|2 +
L∑
i=1
|wHt(k,l)cr(ki)|2 + r−kl
≥ γkl, ∀l
(5)
The optimization in (5) can be converted to
semidefinite programming (SDP) using the rank relaxation
method and solved as in [30] and [31]. The optimal
receive weight vectors can be found using generalized
eigenvector techniques.
CLAIM 1 The optimal transmit and receive beampatterns
are independent of the interradar interference r
–k.
PROOF The proof can be found in Appendix A.
Hence, when the radars reallocate the power of
transmission, the interradar interference plus noise vector
r
–k is modified. From claim 1, radar-k retains the optimal
beampatterns derived from (5), however reallocates
only its transmission power for each target, in order to
achieve the detection criterion. This observation is similar
to that considered in wireless communication applications
[12], regardless of the appearance of additional clutter in
the denominator of the SINR equation in (5). As a result,
after obtaining the optimal transmit/receive beamforming
vectors, we can reformulate the initial optimization
problem (4) as the following power minimization problem:
min
pk1,...,pkL
L∑
l=1
pkl
s.t.
pkl|wˆHt(k,l)hr(kl)|2
L∑
j =l
pkj |wˆHt(k,l)hr(kj )|2+
L∑
i=1
pki|wˆHt(k,l)cr(ki)|2 + r−kl
≥ γkl
(6)
where wˆt(k,l) = w
∗
t(k,l)
‖w∗t(k,l)‖ is the normalized optimal transmit
weight vector and pkl is the power used by radar-k on the
beam directed to target-l. At this point, by redefining the
acceptable strategy as P ′k(p−k) = {pk ∈ RL+ | SINRkl ≥
γkl, ∀l} and the utility function as u′k(pk) =
∑L
l=1 pkl,
game G becomes a power allocation SNG:
G ′ = 〈C, {P ′k(p−k)}k∈C, {u′k(pk)}k∈C〉.
In order to prove the existence and the uniqueness of
the NE of game G, we need to show that the best response
strategy for every player is a standard function. We note
that all the constraints must be active at the optimal power
allocation. As a result, the inequality in the constraints of
(6) can be replaced by equality and can be written as
Gkp∗k = r−k (7)
where Gk ∈ RL×L and its elements are defined as
[Gk]ii = ( |wˆ
H
t(k,i)hr(ki)|2
γki
− |wˆHt(k,i)cr(ki)|2) and
[Gk]ij = −|wˆHt(k,i)hr(kj )|2 − |wˆHt(k,i)cr(kj )|2, for i = j. The
solution of (7) provides the optimal power allocation for
(6). Following claim 2 in [12], the problem (6) is always
feasible ∀r−k > 0 elementwise. As a result, the matrix Gk
must be invertible so we can straightforwardly obtain the
best response strategy for the kth cluster as
p∗k = G−1k r−k (8)
The existence of the solution is guaranteed through the
Arrow-Debreu theorem [33]. Since the NE exists, the
uniqueness of this NE is proved by establishing that the
best response function is standard [12]. We define the
intercluster interference matrix from the mth radar to the
kth radar as Gmk ∈ RL×L and
[Gmk]i,j=|wˆHt(k,i)λr(kmj )|2 + |wˆHt(k,i)μr(km)|2. Hence, by
replacing the interference vector r
–k, we can restate the
best response strategy as
BRk(p−q) = p∗k = G−1k
⎛
⎝ K∑
m=k
Gmkp∗m + 1Lσ 2n
⎞
⎠ , ∀k (9)
where 1L denotes the all ones vector of size L × 1.
LEMMA 1 The best response function (9) is a standard
function.
PROOF The best response strategy (9) satisfies the
following necessary properties for all p ≥ 0:
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a) Positivity: BRk(p) > 0, as Gk–1 is a positive matrix
straightforwardly from (8) and Gmk is a positive matrix
from its definition.
b) Monotonicity: If p ≥ p′, then:
BRk(p) − BRk(p′) = G−1k
⎛
⎝ K∑
m=k
Gmk(pm − p′m)
⎞
⎠ ≥ 0.
c) Scalability: For all a > 1, aBRk(p) > BRk(ap).
Indeed:
aBRk(p) − BRk(ap) = (a − 1)G−1k 1Lσ 2n > 0.
By applying a pricing policy to each player we
introduce some cooperation among them, which leads to a
more Pareto efficient solution, as described in the next
section.
IV. BEAMFORMER DESIGN AND POWER
ALLOCATION GAME WITH PRICING
A. Game Theoretical Formulation
Since each radar optimizes its beamformers and power
allocation greedily, the equilibrium point is not necessarily
the best solution from a social fairness point of view. This
is explained because each player ignores the direct path
interference it induces on other players. In order to obtain
a more Pareto efficient solution and to increase the social
welfare of the SNG, we introduce a pricing scheme
applied to each radar’s utility function. As a result, the
players are encouraged to allocate their available resources
more efficiently by minimizing the direct path interference
induced to the other radars.
In order to achieve the aforementioned advantages,
each radar/player needs to have information about the
channel to the other radars in the system. Since we assume
that the radars belong to the same organization, the
knowledge of the channels between the radars is justified,
as each radar knows the exact position of the others.
Hence, each radar performs the following optimization:
min
Wt(k)
L∑
l=1
∥∥wt(k,l)∥∥2 + K∑
m=k
L∑
i=1
κkmi
∥∥wt(k,i)μr(km)∥∥2
s.t.
|wHt(k,l)hr(kl)|2
L∑
j =l
|wHt(k,l)hr(kj )|2 +
L∑
i=1
|wHt(k,l)cr(ki)|2 + r−kl
≥ γkl, ∀l
(10)
where κkmi is the price charged to radar-k for the
interference it induces to radar m when aiming at target i
and ‖wt(k,i)μr(km)‖2 denotes the corresponding
interference.
The aforementioned optimization encourages each
player to adopt a more socially efficient power allocation
strategy by steering its beampattern to the desired target,
while keeping the sidelobes at the direction of the other
players low and therefore causing less interference to
other radars. As a result, the efficiency of the system as a
whole is improved, yet the distributed nature of the game
is preserved.
In order to reformulate the SNG G to a more
cooperative game with pricing consideration, we just need
to redefine the utility function of radar-k as
vk(Wt(k)) = ‖Wt(k)‖2F +
∑K
m=k
∑L
i=1 κkmi‖wt(k,i)μkm‖2.
The mathematical form of the pricing game is
Gpr = 〈C, {Pk(Wt(−k))}k∈C, {vk(Wt(k))}k∈C〉.
B. Optimal Beamforming and the Best Response
Strategy
In this section, we design the optimal transmit and
receive beamformers and the best response strategy for
each of the players. Therefore, we exploit the fact that the
optimization problem (10) can be reformulated as a
convex optimization problem with second order cone
(SOC) constraints [30]. This important property allows us
to obtain the optimal solution via duality. The Lagrangian
associated with the optimization problem (10) can be
written as
L(Wt(k),λk)
=
L∑
l=1
∥∥wt(k,l)∥∥2 + K∑
m=k
L∑
i=1
κkmi
∥∥wt(k,i)μr(km)∥∥2
+
L∑
l=1
λkl
( L∑
j =l
|wHt(k,l)hr(kj )|2 +
L∑
i=1
|wHt(k,l)cr(ki)|2+r−kl
− 1
γkl
|wHt(k,l)hr(kl)|2
)
where λk = [λk1, . . . , λkL]T is the L × 1 vector of the
Lagrangian multipliers associated with the SINR
inequality constraints of the problem in (10). The
Lagrangian can be reorganized as
L(Wt(k),λk) =
L∑
l=1
λklr−kl +
L∑
l=1
wHt(k,l)(k(κkml)
−λkl
γkl
hr(ki)hHr(ki) +
L∑
j =l
λkjhr(kj )hHr(kj )
+
L∑
i=1
λklcr(ki)cHr(ki))wt(k,l)
where k(κkmi) =
∑K
m=k
∑L
i=1 κkmiμr(km)μ
H
r(km) + I. At
this point, we define the Lagrange dual function as the
minimum value of the Lagrangian over Wt(k):
gk(λk) = inf
Wt(k)
L(Wt(k),λk).
It is clear that if k(κkml) − λklγkl hr(ki)hHr(ki) +∑L
j =l λkjhr(kj )hHr(kj ) +
∑L
i=1 λklcr(ki)c
H
r(ki) is not positive
semidefinite, the Lagrangian is unbounded below in Wt(k)
and the dual function can take the value –∞. Hence, the
dual problem associated with (10) can be formulated as
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max
λk1,...,λkL
L∑
l=1
λklr−kl
s.t.
L∑
i=1
λklhr(ki)hHr(ki) +
L∑
i=1
λklcr(ki)cHr(ki) + k(κkml)

(
1 + 1
γkl
)
λklhr(kl)hHr(kl), ∀l (11)
min
λk1,...,λkL
wr(k,1),...,wr(k,L)
L∑
l=1
λklr−kl
s.t.
λkl|wHr(k,l)ht(kl)|2
L∑
j =l
λkj |wHr(k,l)ht(kj )|2 +
L∑
i=1
|wHr(k,l)ct(ki)|2 + wHr(k,l)k(κkmi)wr(k,l)
≥ γkl, ∀l (12)
λ
(n+1)
kl =
γkl
1 + γkl ×
1
hHt(kl)
(∑L
i=1 λ
n
klht(ki)hHt(ki) +
∑L
i=1 λ
n
klct(ki)c
H
t(ki) + k(κkml)
)−1
ht(kl)
. (13)
As mentioned in [34] and [12], where the authors
investigate the downlink beamforming problem for
communications application, the dual problem (11) is
analogous to the receive beamforming optimization
problem presented in (12).
Since the constraints are satisfied with equality at
optimality, the optimal Lagrangian multipliers can be
obtained by applying the fixed point iteration [34], as
shown in (13). As proved in [34], the fixed point iteration
described in (13) is shown to be a standard function and is
guaranteed to converge to a unique solution, if the
optimization problem (11) is feasible.
Subsequently, the optimal receive weight vector is the
minimum mean-square error (MMSE) receiver, obtained
as the following equation:
wr(k,l) =
(
L∑
i=1
λklht(ki)hHt(ki) +
L∑
i=1
λklct(ki)cHt(ki)
+k(κkml)
)−1
ht(kl). (14)
Following [35], we can obtain the optimal transmit
beamformer as a scaled version of the receive weight
vector wt(k,l) =
√
δk,lwr(k,l), where δk,l is a scalar factor.
The scaling factors δk,l can be found by exploiting the fact
that the SINR constraints in (10) are met with equality at
optimality. Hence by replacing wt(k,l) =
√
δk,lwr(k,l) into
the SINR constraints, the scaling factors can be found
from the following equation:
δk = F−1r−k (15)
where δk = [δk1, δk2, . . . , δkL]T and F ∈ RL×L and is
defined as [F]ii = ( |w
H
r(k,i)ht(ki)|2
γki
− |wHr(k,i)ct(ki)|2) and
[F]ij = −|wHr(k,i)ht(kj )|2 − |wHr(k,i)ct(kj )|2, for i = j.
Having decided the optimal transmit and receive
beamformers, the solution of problem (10) is concluded.
Similar to the game without pricing consideration, we can
reformulate the initial optimization problem (10) as a
power minimization problem. Following the same analysis
as in Section III and by denoting the power vector of
radar-k as π k ∈ RL+, the best response strategy for the kth
radar can be obtained from the following equation:
π∗k = −1k r−k (16)
where k ∈ RL×L and is defined as
[k]ii = ( |w
H
t(k,i)hr(ki)|2
γki
− |wHt(k,i)cr(ki)|2) and
[k]ij = −|wHt(k,i)hr(kj )|2 − |wHt(k,i)cr(kj )|2, for i = j.
Moreover, we denote the interradar interference matrix
from the mth radar to the kth radar as mk ∈ RL×L and
[mk]i,j = |wHt(k,i)λkmj |2 + |wHt(ki)μr(km)|2. Consequently,
by replacing the interference vector
r−k =
∑K
m=k mkp∗m + 1σ 2n we can redefine the best
response strategy as
BRk(π−k) = π∗k = −1k
⎛
⎝ K∑
m=k
mkπ
∗
m + 1σ 2n
⎞
⎠ , ∀k.
(17)
LEMMA 2 The best response function (16) of the game
with pricing consideration is a standard function.
PROOF The proof is identical to that in lemma 1.
In the next section we present a hierarchical strategic
game, known as the Stackelberg game.
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Fig. 2. Hybrid distributed MIMO radar network with surveillance
radar, two tracking radars and two targets.
V. STACKELBERG GAME SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we consider a hybrid MIMO network.
More specifically, in addition to the multistatic tracking
radar network mentioned in Section II, we incorporate a
surveillance radar as part of the network, as seen in Fig. 2.
We assume that all radars belong to the same organization
and operate in the same field. As a result, the tracking
radars may interfere with the surveillance radar and
deteriorate its performance (increase the probability of
false alarm). In order to guarantee the unimpeded
operation of the system, the interference observed at the
surveillance radar must not exceed a specific value, as
shown below:
K∑
k=1
L∑
l=1
|qHr(sur)gkl|2 ≤ Imax (18)
where gkl = wHt(k,l)a(θsur(k)) denotes the interfering signal
in the direction of the surveillance radar when the kth
tracking radar tags target l, θsur(k) is the direction of the
surveillance radar as observed from the kth tracking radar,
and Imax is the maximum interference allowed. Since there
is no transmit or receive beamformer at the surveillance
radar, its receive filter qr(sur) is a complex scalar.
In order to guarantee constraint (18), an interference
cost can be imposed on every tracking radar in order to
minimize their effect on the surveillance radar. Thus, a
similar pricing mechanism to the previous section can be
applied to every radar with the main objective to minimize
the direct path interference to the surveillance radar.
Owing to the fact that all radars belong to the same
organization, we can safely assume that the information of
the interradar channels is given. Similarly to the previous
section, each tracking radar performs the following
optimization:
min
Wt(k)
L∑
l=1
∥∥wt(k,l)∥∥2 + L∑
i=1
κsur
∥∥wt(k,i)gkl∥∥2
s.t.
|wHt(k,l)hr(kl)|2
L∑
j =l
|wHt(k,l)hr(kj )|2 +
L∑
i=1
|wHt(k,l)cr(ki)|2 + r−kl
≥ γkl, ∀l
(19)
where κsur is the pricing factor of interference, which is
equally imposed by the surveillance radar to all tracking
radars.
This interaction between the radars can be translated to
a power allocation Stackelberg game, where the
surveillance radar is the leader and the tracking radars are
the followers. The strategy of the leader is the price of
interference charged to the followers and the leader’s
utility function is its profit, which is defined as
slead =
K∑
k=1
L∑
l=1
|wHr(sur)gkl|2κsur (20)
min
¯λk1,...,¯λkL
w¯r(k,1),...,w¯r(k,L)
L∑
l=1
¯λklr−kl
s.t.
¯λkl|w¯Hr(k,l)ht(kl)|2
L∑
j =l
¯λkj |w¯Hr(k,l)ht(kj )|2 +
L∑
i=1
|w¯Hr(k,l)ct(ki)|2 + w¯Hr(k,l)k(κsur )w¯r(k,l)
≥ γkl, ∀l (21)
¯λ
(n+1)
kl =
γkl
1 + γkl ×
1
hHt(kl)
(∑L
i=1 ¯λ
n
klht(ki)hHt(ki) +
∑L
i=1 ¯λ
n
klct(ki)c
H
t(ki) + k(κsur )
)−1
hkl
. (22)
Based on the price imposed by the leader, the followers
decide their best response strategy as the result of the
optimization in (19).
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A. Followers’ Game
Since the followers know the price of interference
announced by the leader, they decide their optimal
beamformers and resource allocation by solving the
optimization problem in (19). In order to formulate the
followers’ game, we observe that this game is similar to
the game Gpr , when we redefine the utility function of
player k as sk(Wt(k)) = ‖Wt(k)‖2F+
∑L
i=1 κsur‖wt(k,i)gkl‖2.
Hence the mathematical representation of the followers’
game is
Gf ol = 〈C, {Pk(Wt(−k))}k∈C, {sk(Wt(k))}k∈C〉.
Following the same analysis as for game Gpr , the
optimal beamforming vectors can be derived by exploiting
the duality properties of the convex optimization problem
(18). Hence, respective to the receive weight vector
optimization problem (12), we address the optimization
problem in (21).
We denote ¯λk = [¯λk1, . . . , ¯λkL]T as the L × 1 vector
of the Lagrangian multipliers associated with the
inequality SINR constraints of problem (19),
k(κsur ) =
∑L
i=1 κsurgklgHkl + I and w¯r(k,l) as the M × 1
receive weight vector for radar-k regarding target-l for the
study of the Stackelberg game. Similar to (13), we obtain
the optimal Lagrangian multipliers from (22) (the fixed
point iteration in (22) is a standard function and admits a
unique solution [34]) and the optimal receive
beamformers through the MMSE receiver as
w¯r(k,l) =
( L∑
i=1
¯λklht(ki)hHt(ki) +
L∑
i=1
¯λklct(ki)cHt(ki)
+k(κsur )
)−1
ht(kl). (23)
The optimal transmit beamformers are scaled versions
of the optimal receive weight vectors:
w¯t(k,l) =
√
δk,lw¯r(k,l) (24)
Correspondingly to the method of Gpr and by indicating
the power vector of radar-k as ρk ∈ RL+, the best response
strategy for the kth radar can be obtained from the
following equation:
ρ∗k = 	−1k r−k (25)
where 	k ∈ RL×L and is defined as
[	k]ii = ( |w¯
H
t(k,i)hr(ki)|2
γki
− |w¯Ht(ki)cr(ki)|2) and
[	k]ij = −|w¯Ht(ki)hr(kj )|2 − |w¯Ht(ki)cr(kj )|2, for i = j.
Furthermore, we denote the interradar interference matrix
from the mth radar to the kth radar as 	mk ∈ RL×L and
[	mk]i,j = |w¯Ht(ki)λr(kmj )|2 + |w¯Ht(ki)μr(km)|2.
Consequently, by replacing the interference vector
r−k =
∑K
m=k 	mkp∗m + 1σ 2n we can redefine the best
response strategy as
BRk(ρ−k) = ρ∗k = 	−1k
⎛
⎝ K∑
m=k
	mkρ
∗
m + 1σ 2n
⎞
⎠ , ∀k. (26)
The study on the existence and the uniqueness of the
solution is similar to the one in Section II.
B. Leader’s Game
From the definition of the Stackelberg game, the leader
knows the best response strategy of the followers.
Likewise in our model, the surveillance radar is aware of
the existence of the tracking radars, as they belong to the
same organization, and can determine the followers best
response strategy. Hence, the leader’s optimal strategy is
extracted from the following optimization problem, where
the leader’s profit is maximized, while the interference is
constrained under a maximum value to guarantee the
efficient performance of the surveillance radar.
max
κsur
K∑
k=1
L∑
l=1
|wHr(sur)gkl|2κsur
s.t.
K∑
k=1
L∑
l=1
|wHr(sur)gkl|2 ≤ Imax (27)
In order to determine the optimal price imposed by the
leader to the tracking radars and solve the optimization
problem (27), we adopt the learning algorithm for the
leader as proposed in [16]. Initially, we determine the
price κ∗sur , where the constraint of the optimization
problem (27) is met with equality:
K∑
k=1
L∑
l=1
|wHr(sur)gkl|2 = Imax. (28)
Hence, since the interference is a decreasing function of
the price imposed by the leader, the constraint can be
guaranteed when the price charged to the followers is not
less than κ∗sur , i.e., κsur ≥ κ∗sur . In algorithm 1, we assume
α is the learning rate of the algorithm (α > 0) and κtsur is
the price imposed by the leader at iteration t.
Algorithm 1: Learning algorithm for optimization
problem (27)
1 Set an initial price κ1sur = κ∗sur determined at the
equality of the constraint of optimization problem (27);
2 Determine an increment κsur and set the second price
value as: κ2surκ∗sur + κsur
3 Set t = 1
4 while the convergence is not reached do:
5 Obtain the best response strategies for the tracking
radars, by playing the followers game at price κtsur
6 Calculate the profit of the leader Slead slead at price
κtsur
7 Determine the new price from the following
learning equation:
8 κt+2sur = max
(
1 + α St+1lead−Stlead
κt+1sur −κtsur
κt+1sur , κ
∗
sur
)
(29)
9 Set t = t + 1
10 end while
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Fig. 3. Comparison of transmit beampatterns for player 1 aiming at
target 1 (dB).
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we present some simulation results to
illustrate the performance of the beamformers and the
convergence of the resource allocation methods for all
three different games, which are the beamformer design
and power allocation SNG, the beamformer design and
power allocation game with pricing policy, and the
Stackelberg game. Thus, we consider a bistatic network of
two tracking MIMO radars, where each one consists of
10 transmit/receive antennas with half-wavelength spacing
between adjacent antennas. The referential direction of the
second radar as seen from the first radar is θrad(1,2) = 72◦
and θrad(2,1) = −75◦ conversely. Moreover, we assume
two targets placed at directions θ11 = 37◦, θ12 = 22◦ as
observed from the first radar and θ21 = −38◦, θ22 = −12◦
using the second radar as reference. Furthermore, we
assume strong clutter as a focal point with directions
θcl(1) = 52◦ from radar 1 and θcl(2) = −54◦ using the
second radar as reference. The complex amplitudes of the
targets and the clutter RCS are equal to
β1 = β2 = βcl = 1. The background noise is considered
as AWGN with variance 0.4 and the correlation factors
between the waveforms for different targets l = l′ are fixed
to be equal to 0.1 (k,l,l′ = k,l,m,l′ = 0.1).
A. Comparison of the SNG and the Coordinated Game
with Pricing Consideration
The first stage of the algorithm refers to the design of
the optimal transmit and receive beamformers. In
particular, for the SNG we obtain the aforementioned
beamformers using convex SDP methods for the
optimization problem (5), whereas for the coordinated
game with pricing policy we exploit the duality properties
of the optimization problem (10) and we find the transmit
and receive weight vectors using the solution of the dual
problem (14). It is obvious that in both games the
beampatterns are concentrated on the desired target by
maintaining very low sidelobe levels in other directions.
Figs. 3–6 clearly depict the tendency towards social
welfare of the game with pricing consideration, since the
beampatterns of the first player enforce deep nulls at the
direction of the other player, minimizing the interference
leakage.
Fig. 4. Comparison of transmit beampatterns for player 1 aiming at
target 2 (dB).
Fig. 5. Comparison of transmit beampatterns for player 2 aiming at
target 1 (dB).
Fig. 6. Comparison of transmit beampatterns for player 2 aiming at
target 2 (dB).
The resource allocation optimization is considered at
the second stage of the algorithms for both games
compared. Before the initialization of the games, we
decide the detection criterion for each player by setting the
SINR targets at 7 for radar 1 (γ 11 = γ 12 = 7) and 6.5 for
radar 2 (γ 21 = γ 22 = 6.5) for both games. We also set the
maximum number of game iterations at T = 40 to study
the convergence of the algorithms. Figs. 8 and 9 depict the
resource allocation update for each radar aiming each
target. Power allocation using both methods clearly
converges to a unique solution. Comparing Fig. 8 to Fig. 9
the advantages of the coordinated design with pricing are
obvious, since the transmit power of each radar is lower
compared with that of the SNG without pricing
consideration. This result shows that due to the reduced
interference among the radars using the coordinated
design, as displayed in Fig. 7, each player needs less
power to attain the SINR target, and hence the resource
allocation for this game is more efficient.
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Fig. 7. Interference among MIMO tracking radars with and without
pricing consideration.
Fig. 8. Power allocation convergence for SNG without pricing
consideration.
Fig. 9. Power allocation convergence for coordinated game with
pricing policy.
B. Stackelberg Game
The surveillance radar is placed at direction θ sur(1) =
65o as observed from the first tracking radar and θ sur(2) =
–67o using the second radar as reference. Based on the
price announced by the leader, the followers decide their
optimal beamformers and power allocation by following
game Gf ol . The transmit weight vectors and the power
allocation of the followers, when the price set by the
leader is κsur = 7.4, are depicted in Figs. 10 and 11 and
Fig. 12, respectively. It is clear that the beampatterns of
Fig. 10. Transmit beampatterns for player 1 aiming at targets 1 and 2
respectively (Stackelberg game).
Fig. 11. Transmit beampatterns for player 2 aiming at targets 1 and 2
respectively (Stackelberg game).
Fig. 12. Power allocation convergence for follower game when
κsur = 7.4.
both the followers are steered away from the direction of
the leader and hence the interference leakage to the
surveillance radar is minimized.
In order to find the optimal value of the price set by the
leader, we solve the optimization problem in (27)
incorporating the learning algorithm from Section V. We
set the maximum interference allowed at the surveillance
radar as Imax = 0.0103 and the learning rate as α = 0.2.
For this interference threshold, the corresponding price is
determined as κsur = 7.4, which we consider as the initial
price for the leader’s game. The convergence of the price
set by the leader is shown in Fig. 13. As expected, the
algorithm rapidly converges to the starting price κsur =
7.4, which is the minimum price so that the leader’s
interference constraint is secured.
2770 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON AEROSPACE AND ELECTRONIC SYSTEMS VOL. 52, NO. 6 DECEMBER 2016
Fig. 13. Convergence of price imposed by leader.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have investigated a game theoretic approach to
tackle the problem of joint beamforming and power
allocation in a distributed radar network. At first we
studied an SNG, without any coordination among the
radars/players. Thus each player greedily decides its
optimal beamformers and power allocation. Furthermore,
we incorporated a pricing mechanism to minimize the
interradar interference and to improve the social welfare
of the network. The simulation results confirm that this
partially coordinated game provides a more
Paretto-efficient NE. Additionally, we formulated a
Stackelberg game by introducing a surveillance radar
within the network and studied the convergence of both
the followers’ and the leader’s games. Finally, the proofs
for the existence and the uniqueness of both the partially
coordinated and the noncooperative games have also been
presented.
APPENDIX
PROOF OF CLAIM 1 In order to prove the optimal
beampatterns independence of the interradar interference,
we investigate the dual problem of the optimization
problem (5). The Lagrangian associated with the
aforementioned problem is given as
L(Wt(k),λk)
=
L∑
l=1
∥∥wt(k,l)∥∥2 + L∑
l=1
λkl
(
L∑
j =l
|wHt(k,l)hr(kj )|2
+
L∑
i=1
|wHt(k,l)cr(ki)|2 + r−kl −
1
γkl
|wHt(k,l)hr(kl)|2
)
where λk = [λk1, . . . , λkL]T is the L × 1 vector of the
Lagrangian multipliers associated with the SINR
inequality constraints of the problem in (10). The
Lagrangian can be reformulated as
L(Wt(k),λk)
=
L∑
l=1
λklr−kl +
L∑
l=1
wHt(k,l)
(
I − λkl
γkl
hr(ki)hHr(ki)
+
L∑
j =l
λkjhr(kj )hHr(kj ) +
L∑
i=1
λklcr(ki)cHr(ki)
)
wt(k,l).
Subsequently, we write the Lagrange dual function as
gk(λk) = inf
Wt(k)
L(Wt(k),λk).
It is clear that I − λkl
γkl
hr(ki)hHr(ki) +
∑L
j =l λkjhr(kj )hHr(kj ) +∑L
i=1 λklcr(ki)c
H
r(ki) must be positive semidefinite, for the
dual problem to be feasible. Hence, the dual problem
associated with (5) can be designed as
max
λk1,...,λkL
L∑
l=1
λklr−kl
s.t.
L∑
i=1
λklhr(ki)hHr(ki) +
L∑
i=1
λklcr(ki)cHr(ki) + I
 λkl
γkl
hr(kl)hHr(kl), ∀l (30)
min
λk1,...,λkL
wr(k,1),...,wr(k,L)
L∑
l=1
λklr−kl
s.t.
λkl|wHr(k,l)ht(kl)|2
L∑
j =l
λkj |wHr(k,l)ht(kj )|2 +
L∑
i=1
|wHr(k,l)ct(ki)|2 + wHr(k,l)wr(k,l)
≥ γkl, ∀l (31)
λ
(n+1)
kl =
γkl
1 + γkl ×
1
hHt(kl)
(∑L
i=1 λ
n
klht(ki)hHt(ki) +
∑L
i=1 λ
n
klct(ki)c
H
t(ki) + I
)−1
ht(kl)
. (32)
Following [34] and [12], the dual problem (30) can be
solved through the receive beamforming optimization
problem in (31).
Since the constraints are satisfied with equality at
optimality, the optimal Lagrangian multipliers can be
derived by applying the fixed point iteration method as in
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(32) [36]. It is also shown in [36] that the fixed point
iteration function in (32) belongs to the framework of
standard functions. Thus, the aforementioned iteration
process is guaranteed to converge to a unique solution, if
the respective optimization problem is feasible.
The optimal receive weight vector is the MMSE
receiver, obtained from the following equation:
wr(k,l)
=
(
L∑
i=1
λklht(ki)hHt(ki) +
L∑
i=1
λklct(ki)cHt(ki) + I
)−1
ht(kl).
(33)
Following [35], the optimal transmit beamformer can
be obtained as a scaled version of the receive weight
vector wr(k,l). Thus, it is clear that the optimal transmit and
receive beampatterns are independent of the interradar
plus noise vector r
–k.
REFERENCES
[1] Li, J., and Stoica, P.
MIMO Radar Signal Processing. New York: Wiley,
2009.
[2] Li, J., and Stoica, P.
MIMO radar with colocated antennas.
IEEE Signal Processing Magazine, 24, 5 (Sept. 2007),
106–114.
[3] Haimovich, A. M., Blum, R. S., and Cimini, L. J.
MIMO radar with widely separated antennas.
IEEE Signal Processing Magazine, 25, 1 (Jan. 2008),
116–129.
[4] Fuhrmann, D. R., Browning, J. P., and Rangaswamy, M.
Signaling strategies for the hybrid MIMO phased-array radar.
IEEE Journal of Selected Topics in Signal Processing, 4, 1
(Feb. 2010), 66–78.
[5] Tajer, A., Jajamovich, G. H., Wang, X., and Moustakides, G. V.
Optimal joint target detection and parameter estimation by
MIMO radar.
IEEE Journal of Selected Topics in Signal Processing, 4, 1
(Feb. 2010), 127–145.
[6] Duly, A. J., Love, D. J., and Krogmeier, J. V.
Time-division beamforming for MIMO radar waveform
design.
IEEE Transactions on Aerospace and Electronic Systems, 4, 2
(Apr. 2013), 1210–1223.
[7] Saad, W., Han, Z., Debbah, M., Hjorungnes, A., and Basar, T.
Coalitional game theory for communication networks.
IEEE Signal Processing Magazine, 26, 5 (Sept. 2009),
77–97.
[8] Rashid-Farrokhi, F., Tassiulas, L., and Liu, K. J. R.
Joint optimal power control and beamforming in wireless
networks using antenna arrays.
IEEE Transactions on Communications, 46, 10 (Oct. 1998),
1313–1324.
[9] Yu, W., Ginis, G., and Cioffi, J. M.
Distributed multiuser power control for digital subscriber
lines.
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, 20, 5
(June 2002), 1105–1115.
[10] Saraydar, C. U., Mandayam, N. B., and Goodman, D. J.
Efficient power control via pricing in wireless data networks,
IEEE Transactions on Communications, 50, 2 (Feb. 2002),
291–303.
[11] Saraydar, C. U., Mandayam, N. B., and Goodman, D. J.
Pricing and power control in a multicell wireless data network,
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, 19, 10
(Oct. 2001), 1883–1892.
[12] Nguyen, D. H. N., and Le-Ngoc, T.
Multiuser downlink beamforming in multicell wireless
systems: A game theoretical approach.
IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing, 59, 7 (July 2011),
3326–3338.
[13] Huang, J., Berry, R. A., and Honig, M. L.
Distributed interference compensation for wireless networks.
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, 24, 5
(May 2006), 1074–1084.
[14] Nguyen, D. N., and Krunz, M.
Power minimization in MIMO cognitive networks using
beamforming games.
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, 31, 5
(May 2013), 916–925.
[15] Wang, B., Han, Z., and Liu, K. J. R.
Distributed relay selection and power control for multiuser
cooperative communication networks using Stackelberg game.
IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing, 8, 7 (May 2009),
975–990.
[16] Duong, N. D., Madhukumar, A. S., and Niyato, D.
Stackelberg Bayesian game for power allocation in two-tier
networks.
IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology, 99 (Apr. 2015),
1–19.
[17] Gogineni, S., and Nehorai, A.
Game theoretic design for polarimetric MIMO radar target
detection.
Signal Processing, 92, 5 (2012), 1281–1289.
[18] Song, X., Willett, P., Zhou, S., and Luh, P.
The MIMO radar and jammer games.
IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing, 60, 2 (Feb. 2012),
687–699.
[19] Piezzo, M., Aubry, A., Buzzi, S., de Maio, A., and Farina, A.
Non-cooperative code design in radar networks: A
game-theoretic approach.
EURASIP Journal on Advances in Signal Processing, 2013, 1
(2013), 63.
[20] Panoui, A., Lambotharan, S., and Chambers, J. A. Game
theoretic power allocation for a multistatic radar network in
the presence of estimation error.
In Sensor Signal Processing for Defence (SSPD), Sept. 2014.
[21] Bacci, G., Sanguinetti, L., Greco, M. S., and Luise, M.
A game-theoretic approach for energy-efficient detection in
radar sensor networks.
In IEEE Sensor Array and Multichannel Signal Processing
Workshop (SAM), June 2012.
[22] Sun, B., Chen, H., Wei, X., Wang, H., and Li, X.
Power allocation for range-only localisation in distributed
multiple-input multiple-output radar networks - A cooperative
game approach.
IET Radar, Sonar and Navigation, 8, 7 (Aug. 2014),
708–718.
[23] He, Q., Blum, R. S., Godrich, H., and Haimovich, A. M.
Target velocity estimation and antenna placement for MIMO
radar with widely separated antennas.
IEEE Journal of Selected Topics in Signal Processing, 4, 1
(Feb. 2010), 79–100.
[24] Gini, F.
Sub-optimum coherent radar detection in a mixture of
K-distributed and Gaussian clutter.
IEE Proceedings - Radar, Sonar and Navigation, 144, 1 (Feb.
1997), 39–48.
[25] Conte, E., Lops, M., and Ricci, G.
Asymptotically optimum radar detection in
compound-Gaussian clutter.
2772 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON AEROSPACE AND ELECTRONIC SYSTEMS VOL. 52, NO. 6 DECEMBER 2016
IEEE Transactions on Aerospace and Electronic Systems, 31,
2 (Apr. 1995), 617–625.
[26] Fuhrmann, D. R., and San Antonio, G.
Transmit beamforming for MIMO radar systems using signal
cross-correlation.
IEEE Transactions on Aerospace and Electronic Systems, 44,
1 (Jan. 2008), 171–186.
[27] Hassanien, A., and Vorobyov, S. A.
Transmit energy focusing for DOA estimation in MIMO radar
with colocated antennas.
IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing, 59, 6 (Mar. 2011),
2669–2682.
[28] Stoica, P., Li, J., and Xie, Y.
On probing signal design for MIMO radar.
IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing 55, 8 (Aug. 2007),
4151–4161.
[29] Deligiannis, A., Lambotharan, S., and Chambers, J. A.
Beamforming for fully-overlapped two-dimensional
phased-MIMO radar.
IEEE Radar Conference (RadarCon), Arlington, VA, May
2015.
[30] Bengtsson, M., and Ottersen, B.
Optimal downlink beamforming using semidefinite
optimization.
In Proceedings of 37th Annual Allerton Conference on
Communication, Control, and Computing, 1999.
[31] Luo, Z.-Q., Ma, W.-K., So, A. M.-C., Ye, Y., and Zhang, S.
Semidefinite relaxation of quadratic optimization problems.
IEEE Signal Processing Magazine, 27, 3 (May 2010), 20–34.
[32] Yates, R. D.
A framework for uplink power control in cellular radio
systems.
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications (Sept
1995).
[33] Arrow, K., and Debreu, G.
Existence of an equilibrium for a competitive economy.
Econometrica, 3, 22 (1954), 256–290.
[34] Wiesel, A., Eldar, Y. C., and Shamai, S.
Linear precoding via conic optimization for fixed MIMO
receivers.
IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing, 54, 1 (Jan. 2006),
161–176.
[35] Yu, W., and Lan, T.
Transmitter optimization for the multi-antenna downlink with
per-antenna power constraints.
IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing, 55, 6 (June 2007),
2646–2660.
[36] Dahrouj, H., and Yu, W.
Coordinated beamforming for the multicell multi-antenna
wireless system.
IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications, 9, 5 (May
2010), 1748–1759.
Anastasios Deligiannis (S’15) received his Diploma (Bachelor and Masters degrees
equivalent) from the School of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of
Patras, Greece, in 2012. From 2013 he is a Ph.D. candidate within the Signal Processing
and Networks Research Group, Wolfson School of Mechanical, Manufacturing and
Electrical Engineering, Loughborough University, UK.
Since June 2016, he is a Research Associate in Signal Processing in Loughborough
University. His research focuses on the design of signal processing algorithms,
incorporating convex optimization and game theoretic methods, within the radar
network framework.
Sangarapillai Lambotharan (SM’06) received his Ph.D. degree in signal processing
from Imperial College London, UK, in 1997, and remained there until 1999 as a
Postdoctoral Research Associate.
He was a Visiting Scientist in the Engineering and Theory Center of Cornell
University, NY in 1996. From 1999 to 2002, he was with the Motorola Applied
Research Group, UK, as a research engineer, working in many various projects,
including physical-link layer modelling and performance characterization of GPRS,
EGPRS, and UTRAN. From 2002 to 2007, he was with the King’s College London,
UK, and Cardiff University, UK, as a Lecturer and Senior Lecturer, respectively. He is
currently Professor of Digital Communications and the Head of Signal Processing and
Networks Research Group at Loughborough University, UK. His current research
interests include wireless communications, cognitive radio networks, smart grids,
radars, convex optimizations, and game theory.
Dr. Lambotharan has published over 175 conference and journal articles in the areas
of his research interests. He serves as an Associate Editor for the EURASIP Journal on
Wireless Communications and Networking.
DELIGIANNIS ET AL.: GAME THEORETIC ANALYSIS FOR MIMO RADARS WITH MULTIPLE TARGETS 2773
Jonathon Chambers (S’83—M’90—SM’98—F’11) received the Ph.D. and D.Sc.
degrees in signal processing from the Imperial College of Science, Technology and
Medicine (Imperial College London), London, UK, in 1990 and 2014, respectively.
From 1991 to 1994, he was a Research Scientist with Schlumberger Cambridge
Research, Cambridge, UK. In 1994, he returned to Imperial College London as a
Lecturer in signal processing and was promoted to Reader (Associate Professor) in
1998. From 2001 to 2004, he was the Director of the Center for Digital Signal
Processing and a Professor of signal processing within the Division of Engineering,
King’s College London, and is now a Visiting Professor. From 2004 to 2007, he was a
Cardiff Professorial Fellow with the School of Engineering, Cardiff University, Cardiff,
UK. Between 2007–2014, he led the Advanced Signal Processing Group, within the
School of Electronic, Electrical and Systems Engineering, Loughborough University,
UK, and is now a Visiting Professor. In 2015, he joined the School of Electrical and
Electronic Engineering, Newcastle Universtiy, where he is a Professor of signal and
information processing and heads the ComS2IP group. He is also a Guest Professor at
Harbin Engineering University.
Dr. Chambers has served as advisor to more than 70 Ph.D. graduates and published
more than 500 outputs. He is a Fellow of the Royal Academy of Engineering, the
Institution of Electrical Engineers, and the Institute of Mathematics in its Applications
in the UK. He has served as an Associate Editor for IEEE Transactions on Signal
Processing for three terms over the periods 1997–1999, 2004–2007, and as a Senior
Area Editor 2011–2015.
2774 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON AEROSPACE AND ELECTRONIC SYSTEMS VOL. 52, NO. 6 DECEMBER 2016
